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The integrity of positioning systems has become an increasingly important requirement
for location-based intelligent transport systems (ITS), for example electronic toll collection
(ETC), public transport operations and traffic control services. In ITS, satellite navigation
systems, such as global positioning system (GPS), are used to provide real-time vehicle
positioning information including details of longitude, latitude, direction and speed. Map
matching algorithms are used to integrate the positioning information into the digital road
map. However, the navigation systems used in ITS cannot provide the high quality posi-
tioning information required by most services, due to the various types of errors made in
the map matching process and experienced by GPS sensors such as signal outage, and
errors due to atmospheric effects and receiver measurement errors, all of which are
difficult to measure. An error in the positioning information or map matching process
might lead to the inaccurate determination of a vehicle location. This could have legal or
economic consequences for ITS applications such as traffic law enforcement systems (e.g.,
speed fining). Such applications require integrity when measuring the vehicle position and
speed information and in the map matching process when locating the vehicle on the
correct road segment to avoid errors when charging drivers. Consequently, the integrity
algorithm for the navigation system should include a guarantee that the systems do not
produce misleading or faulty information as this may lead to significant errors in the ITS
services provided. In this paper, a high integrity GPS monitoring algorithm based on the
concept of context-awareness that can be applied with real time ITS services to integrate
changes in the integrity status of the navigation system was developed. Results suggest
that the new integrity algorithm can support various types of location-based ITS services
(e.g., route guidance).
© 2016 Periodical Offices of Chang'an University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on
behalf of Owner. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).6170.
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The growth of intelligent transport systems (ITS) in the last
decade has resulted in a significant improvement in road
safety and monitoring, as it plays a key role in avoiding many
transportation problems, such as road accidents and traffic
congestion (Qureshi and Abdullah, 2013). ITS services include
trafficmanagement, electronic payment, route guidance, fleet
management, and emergency management vehicle services.
These services are mainly supported by positioning and
navigation capabilities, and most require real time
positioning data, which can be referred to as location-based
ITS services.
Twomain components are found in any location-based ITS
used in vehicle navigation systems and services, namely (i) a
geometric positioning system, such as a global positioning
system (GPS) or an integrated navigation system, such as dead
reckoning (DR) and (ii) a geographic information system (GIS)
based on digital roadmaps (Taylor and Blewitt, 2006). Another
essential component of ITS services is a map matching (MM)
algorithm, which is used to determine the correct road
segment and road link on which a vehicle is travelling to
integrate this positioning information into the digital road
map (Quddus et al., 2006).
Therefore, ITS services (e.g., route guidance) can affect the
efficiency of the route guidance service and may confuse the
driver depending primarily on the positioning data received
from a positioning system (e.g., GPS) (Velaga et al., 2012).
However, a stand-alone GPS cannot provide the high quality
positioning data required by most ITS services (Feng and
Ochieng, 2007; Li et al., 2013). This is due to the various
types of errors associated with the received positioning data
such as signal outage, and errors due to atmospheric effects,
receiver measurement errors, and multipath errors (Kaplan
and Hegarty, 2006). Digital road maps are more reliable than
a stand-alone GPS, thus map matching algorithms can
contribute to improving the accuracy of positioning data
(Bastiaansen, 1996; Bullock and Krakiwsky, 1994; Yu et al.,
2006). This is because map matching algorithms consider
different types of information including position, speed, and
direction in the matching process in order to identify the
location of the vehicle on the road segment (Quddus et al.,
2006). However, map matching algorithms, may locate the
vehicle on a wrong road segment due to the poor quality of
input data (Chen et al., 2005; Quddus et al., 2006, 2007; White
et al., 2000) which can lead to significant errors in ITS
services (Velaga, 2010). Therefore, it is important to check
and monitor the quality of the positioning information
obtained from the GPS sensor and other input data to the
map matching algorithm in order to detect any misleading
or faulty information and notify the user, thus increasing
the integrity of the system (Ochieng and Sauer, 2002).
According to Yu et al. (2006), the integrity of a system refers
to its ability to detect blunders in input data and faults in
the map matching process.
Studies have been carried out to monitor and improve the
integrity of in-vehicle navigation systems. These studies have
either focused on improving the integrity of raw positioning
data (Andres and Daniel, 2012) and the integrity of the mapmatching process (Jabbour et al., 2008; Yu et al., 2006), or
combination of both (Quddus, 2006; Velaga, 2010). Moreover,
Velaga (2010) has considered the complexity of the road
network (urban and rural areas) in the integrity process in
addition to the integrity of raw positioning data and map
matching process. These researchers including Quddus and
Velaga used speed to calculate distance in the map
matching process, but they did not check the integrity of the
speed measurements. Quddus (2006) has mentioned that
speed is an essential factor in enhancing the map matching
algorithm. Indeed, monitoring speed integrity is vital.
According to Li et al. (2013), failure in any factor in the map
matching process can lead to defects throughout the whole
process. Thus, checking the integrity of the speed
measurements has the potential to improve the overall
integrity process and lead to more accurate outcomes.
Yet, to the best of the authors' knowledge, there is no
existing method for monitoring the integrity of in-vehicle
navigation systems taking into account the integrity of the
vehicle speed. In the light of this, the main aim of this study is
to contribute to the improvement of the integrity of in-vehicle
navigation systems in order to support the positioning
requirement of location-based ITS services. This can be ach-
ieved by developing a robust and reliable GPS integrity
monitoring algorithm based on the concept of context-
awareness. Context-awareness can provide ITS applications
adequate information about the current integrity status of the
navigation system (Hong et al., 2009). The proposed algorithm
will ensure the integrity of in-vehicle navigation systems by
taking into account three types of information-vehicle
position, vehicle speed, and the result of the map matching
process. Existing methods focus on monitoring the integrity
of positioning information, the map matching process or
both. However this algorithm will incorporate a new layer to
monitor the integrity of the speed measurements, which can
significantly enhance the performance of the map matching
algorithm and the overall integrity process.
The algorithm is divided into three integrity phases,
including (i) the positioning integrity phase, (ii) the speed
integrity phase and (iii) the map matching integrity phase.
Each phase uses different techniques to examine the consis-
tency of the GPS information. A receiver autonomous integrity
monitoring (RAIM) algorithm, which is an algorithm used to
measure the integrity of GPS signal, is used to measure the
quality of the GPS positioning data. GPS Doppler information
(Doppler Effect), which refers to the difference between the
calculated frequency at the GPS receiver and the satellite
carrier frequency (Chalko, 2007), is used to check the integrity
of the vehicle speed measurements. The final phase in the
integrity algorithm is intended to verify the integrity of the
map matching process. In this phase, fuzzy logic is also used
to measure the integrity level, which guarantees the validity
and integrity of the map matching results.
The system architecture of the proposed GPS integrity
monitoring algorithm is designed on the basis of the five
layered context-aware framework (Dey et al., 2001) (Fig. 1).
The architecture is composed of three main subsystems:
sensing subsystem, reasoning subsystem, and application
subsystem. These subsystems correspond to the main
phases of the context-aware system. The first subsystem is
Fig. 1 e System architecture.
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position, speed, and direction. The second subsystem
applies the integrity algorithm to reason out the integrity of
the collected information about the vehicle. The final
subsystem is used to warn the driver about the integrity
status of the in-vehicle navigation systems.
The algorithm was tested using real field data collected in
Nottingham. A special vehicle equipped with highly accurate
sensors was used as a “true reference” to assess the reliability
and the validity of the output of the algorithm. The results
suggest that the algorithm can verify the integrity of the
output with an accuracy of 98.6%.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 provides an overview of exiting integrity methods.
Section 3 describes the proposed integrity monitoring
algorithm. Section 4 analyses and evaluates the results.
Section 5 puts forward a discussion of the results. Finally,
Section 6 concludes this study.2. Existing integrity methods
Integrity of in-vehicle navigation systems is considered to be
an essential requirement for supporting most ITS services.
Therefore, a number of studies have been carried out to
monitor and improve it using different methods. Some re-
searchers have tried to monitor integrity by checking the
validity of raw positioning data (Andres and Daniel, 2012).
Other researchers have tried to monitor the integrity of the
map matching process (Jabbour et al., 2008; Yu et al., 2006)
or combine both (Quddus, 2006; Velaga, 2010). In the
following sections, each of the above mentioned integrity
monitoring method is discussed along with its limitations.
2.1. Positioning integrity methods
Andres (2012) has proposed a geo-object recognition algorithm
for detecting vehicles and charging the drivers a pre-set fee
whenever they travel within the geo-object region. The geo-object represented the tolled regions within an electronic toll
collection (ETC) system. The researcher used a geo-fencing
method to segment the road network into geo-object regions.
In addition, he used the RAIM approach to check the integrity
and the validity of the vehicle's position within the geo-object
region. After determining the integrity of the vehicle position,
the algorithm decided whether to charge the driver or not. If
the vehicle position was not within the geo-object region, the
algorithm waited for the next positioning point. The RAIM
method was considered in the integrity process, but it is not
sufficient to check the integrity of the vehicle position, espe-
cially for critical applications. In addition, no map matching
algorithm, which could help to improve the accuracy of
positioning data, was used in the integrity process (Bas-
tiaansen, 1996; Bullock and Krakiwsky, 1994; Yu et al., 2006).
2.2. Map matching integrity methods
Jabbour et al. (2008) have developed a map matching integrity
method for land vehicle navigation systems based on a multi-
hypothesis technique. These researchers introduced two
different criteria to check the integrity of the map matching
process, namely the number of efficient hypotheses and the
normalized innovation square. In addition, two threshold
values were empirically derived and used in the monitoring
process. The integrity method was tested in France using
real field data. The results indicated 88.8% valid integrity
warnings. However, these did not include the errors
associated with the road map.
Yu et al. (2006) have provided a curve pattern matching
algorithm to detect mismatches and improve the reliability
of the map matching results. The algorithm started from
matching vehicle positions with the road map and then
formed two curves from the positioning points and the
matched points, respectively. The algorithm detected the
mismatch by comparing the two curves together. If a
mismatch was detected, the algorithm restarted and
corrected it. The algorithm was evaluated using a large
amount of data (3000 km) collected in Hong Kong. The
performance was evaluated using missed detection rate
(MDR) only and was 1.41%. Errors associated with
positioning data and the road map were not considered.
2.3. Hybrid integrity methods
Quddus (2006) has proposed a method for checking the
integrity of the map matching process. He considered two
sources of information: (i) errors associated with positioning
data and (ii) errors associated with map matching data.
Besides, a fuzzy inference system was used to combine
these information and infer the integrity threshold. The
threshold was empirically calculated to be 70. However, this
value might vary depending on the type of operational
environments and the sensors that were used. The method
was tested using three different map matching algorithms.
The results showed that 91.2% integrity warnings for the
topological map matching algorithm were valid.
Velaga (2010) has presented an integrity algorithm which
takes errors associated with positioning data, digital road
network and the map matching process into consideration.
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integrity of the GPS positioning data and fuzzy logic was
used to determine the validity of the map matching process.
In addition to these two attributes, the complexity of the
road network during the integrity process was also
considered. The algorithm was tested using field data
collected in Nottingham. The results showed that the
algorithm could provide 98.2% valid integrity warnings.
The existing methods for checking the integrity of in-
vehicle navigation systems are centred on positioning data,
map matching integrity, or both. Andres (2012) has checked
the integrity of raw positioning data but ignored the integrity
of other information. In addition, he did not take the advan-
tages of the map matching algorithm into account in the
integrity process. However, Jabbour et al. (2008) and Yu et al.
(2006) focused on checking the integrity of the map
matching process without considering the errors associated
with the positioning data or errors associated with other
inputs to the map matching process. Other researchers
(Quddus, 2006; Velaga, 2010) have tried to combine both
errors associated with positioning data and map matching
process together to enhance the performance of the integrity
monitoring process. However, the quality of the in-vehicle
navigation system output depends on different sources of
errors. These include (i) errors associated with the
positioning data, (ii) errors associated with the map
matching process, and (iii) errors associated with other
inputs to the map matching algorithm (e.g., speed). None of
the above researchers considered errors in other inputs to
the map matching process, such as speed.
Speed is an essential factor in identifying the vehicle po-
sition in themapmatching algorithm. Therefore, checking the
integrity of speed measurements can improve the integrity of
the map matching process. In this article, the authors
considered errors associated with the positioning data, the
speed of the vehicle and the map matching process resulting
simultaneously in the integrity monitoring process, which
could lead to better results. In addition, the proposed solution
can provide information about the integrity of the vehicle
speed measurement which is significantly important espe-
cially for critical ITS applications, such as pay as you speed
(Lahrmann et al., 2012).3. Integrity monitoring algorithm
This section presents the steps taken to develop the GPS
integrity monitoring algorithm. The algorithm can perform
three phases of integrity checks in order to determine the
integrity of the in-vehicle navigation data. These phases are:
(i) the positioning integrity phase, (ii) the speed integrity
phase, and (iii) the map matching integrity phase. A detailed
flowchart for the integrity monitoring algorithm is given in
Fig. 2.
As demonstrated in the flowchart above, the algorithm
starts by checking the integrity of the positioning data
captured from the navigation sensor, GPS. First, it calculates
the horizontal protection level (HPL) based on the positioning
information received from the GPS, which represents the
upper limit for the GPS positioning error in the horizontalplane (Andres, 2012). It then checks the RAIM availability by
comparing the calculated value of HPL with the horizontal
alert limit (HAL). The HAL represents the maximum allowable
error along the horizontal plane which cannot be exceeded
without alerting the user (Andres, 2012). If HPL exceeds HAL,
the RAIM is not available and the user is alerted via the alert
unit. If this is not done, the RAIM is assumed to be available
and thus the algorithm will continue to check the integrity of
the positioning data. Any errors in the calculated position are
detected by comparing a test statistic
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
WSSE
p
which is the
square root of the weighted sum of the square errors (WSSE),
with a selected threshold (T). The user should be alerted if the
test statistic exceeds the selected threshold. If this is not done,
the integrity of the GPS positioning data is assumed available,
and thus, is followed by the speed integrity process.
The integrity of the vehicle speed is also checked. First, the
wheel speed (v)-wheel is comparedwith a selected T. If the (v)-
wheel speed is less than T, then the user needs to be alerted.
Otherwise, the maximum allowable speed error (MASE) and
the estimated speed error are calculated based on the GPS
Doppler data. TheMASE represents the upper limit for the GPS
Doppler speed error that cannot be exceeded without alerting
the user. If MASE is three times greater than the standard error
(s) of the average Doppler speed, then the integrity of the GPS
Doppler speed is assumed available, and the average speed
will be calculated. Otherwise, the speed integrity is unavai-
lable and the user should be alerted.
When the speed integrity is available, a map matching al-
gorithm provided by Cossaboom et al. (2012) is carried out to
locate the travelling vehicle on the road map. A fuzzy
inference system (FIS) is subsequently applied (Table 1) in
order to reason out the integrity of the map matching
process and determine whether the result should be
accepted or rejected. If the result is rejected, the user should
be alerted. Otherwise, the map matching integrity is
assumed available.
The necessary input data for the integrity process is
comprised of positioning data and satellite data from the GPS.
It includes the longitude and latitude coordinates of the
vehicle position, the Doppler speed data, vehicle direction, the
number of satellites, and the satellite coordinates (X, Y and Z).
The wheel speed information from the in-vehicle sensor
network used in the second phase is also inputted into the
algorithm. HAL, probability of a false alarm (PFA), probability
of missed detection (PMD), the minimum speed threshold,
and the digital roadmap scale, are inputted into the algorithm
as constant variables. The following sections describe each
phase in detail.
3.1. Positioning integrity phase
The first phase in the proposed integrity algorithm is an ex-
amination of the consistency of the positioning data. RAIM is a
robust technique that ensures the integrity of GPS data
(Walter and Enge, 1995). In this phase, a RAIMmethod devised
by Walter and Enge (1995) is used to add a layer of integrity
and verify the quality of the GPS positioning data.
Here, the process of monitoring the integrity of the posi-
tioning data is divided into two steps. The first step is the
computation of the HPL from the received positioning data in
Fig. 2 e Flowchart of integrity monitoring algorithm.
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detection process, based on the use of a weighted least
squares approach (Walter and Enge, 1995). The details of these
two steps are set out as below.
Step 1: Checking RAIM availabilityRAIM availability is checked using a HPL parameter, which
is calculated by the following formula, as given by Walter and
Enge (1995).
HPL ¼maxðHslopeÞTðN;PFAÞ þ kðPMDÞHDOP (1)
where HDOP is the horizontal dilution of precision, T is the
Table 1 e Fuzzy inference system.
Rule Note
R1 If DA is good, DD is low, DS is low,
then integrity scale is very high
R2 If DA is good, DD is low, DS is
average, then integrity scale is very
high
R3 If DA is good, DD is average, DS is
low, then integrity scale is very high
R4 If DA is good, DD is low, DS is high,
then integrity scale is high
R5 If DA is good, DD is average, DS is
average, then integrity scale is high
R6 If DA is good, DD is high, DS is low,
then integrity scale is high
R7 If DA is good, DD is average, DS is
high, then integrity scale is average
R8 If DA is good, DD is high, DS is
average, then integrity scale is
average
R9 If DA is good, DD is high, DS is high,
then integrity scale is low
R10 If DA is bad, DD is low, DS is low,
then integrity scale is low
R11 If DA is bad, DD is low, DS is average,
then integrity scale is low
R12 If DA is bad, DD is average, DS is low,
then integrity scale is low
R13 If DA is bad, DD is low, DS is high,
then integrity scale is low
R14 If DA is bad, DD is average, DS is
average, then integrity scale is low
R15 If DA is bad, DD is high, DS is low,
then integrity scale is low
R16 If DA is bad, DD is average, DS is
high, then integrity scale is low
R17 If DA is bad, DD is high, DS is
average, then integrity scale is low
R18 If DA is bad, DD is high, DS is high,
then integrity scale is low
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ellites (N) and PFA, k(PMD) is the number of standard de-
viations for each PMD, Hslope is the maximum allowable
horizontal slope. The values for PFA and PMD are chosen as
0.001 and 0.00001, respectively, as recommended by Feng and
Ochieng (2007). The maximum allowable horizontal slope is
calculated, as given by Walter and Enge (1995).
maxðHslopeÞ ¼max
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃh
ðGWGÞ1GTW
i2
1i
þ
h
ðGWGÞ1GTW
i2
2i
r
ﬃﬃ
I
p  GðGWGÞ1GTWii
(2)
where G is an observation matrix,W is the weight matrix, I is
the identity matrix. After calculating the value of HPL, it is
then compared with the maximum HAL in order to check
whether or not the RAIM is available. As suggested by Velaga
et al. (2012), the selected HAL value is 15 m, which will
support the majority of ITS services.
Step 2: Error detectionIn this step, a weighted least squares approach is used to
identify potential errors in the positioning data (Walter and
Enge, 1995). A test statistic is compared with a selected T in
order to detect any errors. The test statistic is the square
root of WSSE (Walter and Enge, 1995). T is selected on the
basis of a number of satellites and the probability of a false
alarm. The calculation of WSSE is given as follows (Walter
and Enge, 1995).
WSSE ¼ YTW½ðI PÞY (3)
P ¼ GGTWG1GTW (4)
where G is the design matrix, Y is the range of the residuals,
which details can be obtained by Velaga (2010).
If the test statistic
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
WSSE
p
exceeds the selected T, then the
positioning solution is assumed to be unacceptable. Other-
wise, the positioning solution is considered acceptable and
the integrity process continues checking the speed integrity of
the travelling vehicle. The following section provides a
detailed explanation of the speed integrity phase.3.2. Speed integrity phase
The second phase in the proposed integrity algorithm is to
determine the speed of the vehicle as precisely as possible and
ensure the integrity of the estimation. One of the most accu-
rate methods of estimating vehicle speed is using the Doppler
effect (Chalko, 2007). In this phase, GPS Doppler speed
measurements are used to provide an accurate estimation of
the speed. For integrity validation purposes, two steps are
taken before measuring the speed of the vehicle from the
GPS Doppler data. The first step is to check the vehicle speed
status from the wheel speed sensor, and the second step is
to detect the speed error based on the use of the speed
dilution of precision (SDOP) parameter, which is a SiRF3
parameter that can be used to determine the accuracy of
GPS Doppler speed (Chalko, 2009).
Step 1: Checking speed status
Despite the fact that the GPS can estimate speed with an
accuracy of 2e5 cm/s and 4e10 cm/s on both the horizontal
axis and the vertical axis, respectively (Davidson et al., 2008),
the magnitude of errors at the estimated speed (based on
the Doppler shift) is inversely proportional to the actual
speed of the vehicle (Jo et al., 2012). As a result, GPS Doppler
measurements are not reliable at low speeds, due to the
significant increase in the error magnitude.
Therefore, it is vital to check the vehicle speed status
before measuring the speed from the Doppler data. This step
is taken using wheel speed information, which can be
accessed through the in-vehicle sensor network (D'Orazio
et al., 2011). (v)-wheel is compared with a specified T, which
is the minimum speed at which the Doppler data is reliable.
In this research, the value of T is chosen to be 2 m/s, as
suggested by Bonnabel and Salaun (2011). If the (v)-wheel
exceeds T, then the GPS Doppler data is assumed to be
accurate and can be used to estimate the real time vehicle
speed. Otherwise, GPS Doppler data cannot always be relied
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direction information is assumed to be inaccurate at low
speeds, so it will not be used during the next phase (Ochieng
et al., 2004).
Step 2: Speed error detection
Although the GPS Doppler measurements can provide an
accurate estimation of average speed for N samples, each
Doppler speed sample includes errors (Chalko, 2007). These
include atmospheric and relativistic errors (Zhang et al.,
2004) thus the actual values cannot be established. In this
case, the integrity of Doppler speed measurements is
difficult to check as the actual value of the speed errors ðSnEÞ
of each speed sample is unknown. Here, the SDOP
parameter is used to estimate the MASE for N Doppler speed
measurements and to verify the integrity of the speed error
for these samples as the MASE is required to be three times
larger than the standard error s of average Doppler speed
(Chalko, 2009). This ensures a 99.9% confidence level when
estimating the speed error is estimated (Chalko, 2009). The
calculation of the average MASE for N second sample and
the speed error, as given by Chalko (2009).
MASE ¼
PN
n¼0SDOPn
N
 SDOP0 þ SDOPN
2N
(5)
SE ¼MASE
. ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N
p
(6)
where SDOP0 and SDOPN are the first and last SDOP values,
respectively, in the sampling interval, SDOPn is the SDOP value
for each Doppler speed in the sampling interval, N is the
number of samples in the sampling interval, SE is speed error.
After calculating the speed error, its integrity is verified by
comparing the MASE value with the standard error s for the N
Doppler speed samples. If the MASE is less than three times
the standard error s, then the integrity of the Doppler speed is
assumed to be unavailable. Otherwise, it can be stated that the
speed error for the N Doppler speed samples is calculated
accurately with a 99.9% confidence level, and the true speed of
the vehicle can be precisely calculated.
Here, vehicle speed is estimated using the average speed of
N samples (rather than a single speed sample) in order to
obtain a higher accuracy (Chalko, 2007). The calculation of the
actual average speed is given as follows (Chalko, 2009).
ASt ¼ ASD±SE (7)
ASD ¼
PN
n¼0SnD
N
 S0D þ SND
2N
(8)
where S0D and SND are the first and last Doppler speed sam-
ples, respectively, in the sampling interval, SnD is the discrete
measurement of the Doppler speed in the sampling interval,
ASt and ASD are the true and Doppler average speed,
respectively.3.3. Map matching integrity phase
In the final phase of the proposed integrity algorithm, the
process continues with the map matching process only if theintegrity of both the positioning and the speed data are
available. This is because the accuracy of the map matching
process depends on the quality of input data (Chen et al.,
2005). Thus, checking the integrity of positioning and speed
data will improve the performance and integrity of the map
matching process and lead to more accurate outcomes.
Here, a topological map matching algorithm provided by
Cossaboomet al. (2012) is carried out to integrate thepositioning
data into the roadmap,anddetermine the road segmentand the
linkwhere thevehicle is travelling.FIS (Table1) is thenapplied to
evaluate the uncertainties of the map matching results and
identify its integrity level in order to decide whether to trigger
an alert to the driver. The FIS used in this phase is based on
three factors: distance, speed and direction of the travelling
vehicle, both before and after the map matching process. The
calculation of these factors is given as follows.
3.3.1. Distance
Due to the fact that the line connecting all positioning points
is not smooth (zig-zag), the distance (computed using the
accumulative distance between GPS points) always over-
estimates the real travelling distance (Chalko, 2007).
Therefore, the accumulative distances of the positioning
points should be compared with those of the corresponding
spatial positions on the road segment (after the map
matching process). In this case, the error associated with the
positioning data should be considered. The accumulative
distances are expressed as follows
DGPS ¼
XN
n¼1dGPS (9)
DMap ¼
XN
n¼1dMap 
XN
n¼1sGPSn þ sMapn (10)
DD ¼ DMap  DGPS (11)
where DGPS and DMap are the accumulative distances, respec-
tively, before and after the map matching process, the dis-
tance between two GPS points and the matched points on the
road segment are dGPS and dMap, respectively, sGPSn is the error
associated with GPS for each point, sMapn is the error associ-
ated with the digital road map for each point.
If the absolute value of the difference between
(DMap  DGPS) is equal to or approximately zero, then it can be
assumed that the vehicle location on the map is identified
correctly by the map matching process and vice versa. The
value of DD is needed in the fuzzy phase to solve the problem
of the zig-zag. Finally, it once obtained and checked, can be
used with confidence in speed calculation.
3.3.2. Speed
The speed calculated from the accumulated distances of N
samples of thematched locations on the map should be equal
to, or close to the corresponding average Doppler speed, as
computed in the previous phase. The computation of the
speed and distance are expressed as follows
SpeedMap ¼ ADMap

time (12)
DS ¼ SpeedMap ASD (13)
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distance and time spending in the map matching process,
respectively. If the absolute value of the difference between
(ASD  SpeedMap) is equal to, or approximately zero, then it
can be said that the result of the map matching process is
more accurate, and vice versa. The value of DS is needed in the
fuzzy phase to verify the speed integrity.
3.3.3. Direction
The direction of the matched road segment should be the
same as the direction of the travelling vehicle. Here, the di-
rection (azimuth angle) of the travelling vehicle obtained from
the GPS is comparedwith that of thematched road segment. If
the absolute value of the difference between
(HeadingMap  HeadingGPS) is less than the threshold, then it
can be said that the selection of the road segment in the map
matching process is more consistent.
Table 1 demonstrates the fuzzy inference system (FIS) used
in this phase. The input factors are (i) the difference in
distance (DD), (ii) the difference in speed (DS), and (iii) the
difference in direction (DA). The fuzzy subset are good and
bad for DA, and are low, average and high for DS and DD.
The single FIS output is the integrity level, which refers to
the confidence level of the map matching process. The fuzzy
subsets associated with the integrity level are very high,
high, average, low, and very low. The formulations of the
fuzzy rules are based on the state of each factor.4. System analysis
The analysis of the proposed algorithm requires collecting
certain positioning data that is precise enough to thoroughly
test each of the algorithm's component. The environment of
the data collection varies among urban, suburban and rural
areas. Thus, it is important to thoroughly test GPS signal
availability at the RAIM level. Vehicle speed is also vital for the
algorithm and the fuzzy system. The analysis also requires
data to be collected using two different GPS receivers, where
one receiver can act as a true reference to the other.Fig. 3 e NGI test vehicle.4.1. Data collection
For the testing of the proposed integrity framework, the
required data is given as follows.
① Satellite data: this data includes satellite number or ID,
satellite coordinates (X, Y, and Z in earth-centred earth-
fixed (ECEF) coordinate system), satellite clock bias,
satellite elevation, and azimuth angles.
② User data: this data relates to the user X, Y, and Z po-
sition in the ECEF coordinate system.
③ Vehicle speed: this data obtained from the wheel speed
sensor.
④ Doppler speed: this data is obtained from the GPS
receiver.
⑤ Map data: this data represents the road network in
terms of links. For each link, there is a link ID, a start
node, and an end node.A GPS receiver with certain capabilities is essential for
collecting the data and a GT-31 GPS receiver from Locosys
(http://www.locosystech.com/) was used in this study.
Despite being inexpensive, the GT-31 is equipped with
highly advanced navigation technologies and has been
adopted by major GPS manufacturers including TomTom,
Garmin, and Magellan. GT-31 supports some technologies
including:
① Doppler speed (HDOP, SDOP, etc).
② SiRF Star III low power chip that decodes GPS signals at a
very low signal level (160 dB).
The GT-31 alone is not sufficient to produce an accurate
evaluation of the proposed integrity algorithm. Hence, there is
a need for another source of data that is more accurate than
the GT-31 to act as a true reference. The true reference GPS
receiver was obtained from the Geospatial Institute at the
University of Nottingham. It is a highly advanced carrier-
phase, single frequency high sensitivity GPS receiver, inte-
grated with a high-grade inertial navigation system (INS). In
addition, a gyroscope and integrated carrier-phase INS were
used. Aponte et al. (2009) have found that the accuracy of the
integrated carrier-phase GPS and INS is better than 5 cm for
over 97.5% of the time, among all three coordinate
components (i.e., X, Y and Z coordinates). A special data
collection vehicle, containing all the aforementioned true
reference GPS devices, was hired from the University of
Nottingham (Fig. 3). The GT-31 was mounted in the vehicle
along with the true reference.
The data was collected in the city of Nottingham and the
surrounding villages. There were 5685 positioning points in
total and the test routes covered 82.7 km. Fig. 4 shows the full
test routes followed during the journey.
The journey was divided into three data sets based on the
operational environment. Table 2 reveals the track
environment, point, and length for each data set.
The first data set was collected in an urban environment.
The urban setting was chosen due to the challenges posed to
GPS signal availability in urban environment where high
buildings, tunnels and narrow streets obstructed GPS satellite
Fig. 4 e Full test routes in and around Nottingham.
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and is 6.4 km in length.
The second data set was collected in a rural environment,
consisted of 3335 positioning points and covered 6.5 km
(Fig. 6). Fig. 7 depicts the test route for the third data set, and it
was 8.6 km in length and consisted of 1105 positioning points.
The collection environment for this track combined both
urban and rural areas providing a number of challenges in
these areas in relation to gathering GPS data.4.2. Integrity level inference
There are some cases where some uncertainties remain after
positioning data is validated against RAIM, Doppler, and map
matching. These instances resulted from errors in the digital
map, the map matching process and the quality of the posi-
tioning points. The best way to deal with such cases is tomake
use of fuzzy logic and develop rules to deal with all possibleTable 2 e Three different data sets collected in
Nottingham.
Data set Environment Point Length (km)
1 Urban 1245 6.4
2 Rural 3335 6.5
3 Mix 1105 8.6cases of uncertainties. An integrity scale is required to reflect
the confidence level associated with each set of positioning
data after it is matched on the map. According to Quddus
(2006), the range of an integrity scale starts at “0” and ends
at “100”. When the outcome of the fuzzy system equals to
“0”, it means that the positioning data is untraceable and
has no integrity at any level in the system. The highest
value that the fuzzy system can indicate is “100” which
means that the positioning data is wholly trustworthy.
Based on this scale, the system makes it possible to alert the
user when positioning data is lower than the integrity
threshold. The fuzzy system developed follows the Sugeno
type and has three input factors.
 DA: in terms of land navigation, an azimuth is the hori-
zontal angle measured clockwise from a reference plane
(Cossaboom et al., 2012). Based on observations in the
collected data sets, a change in the azimuth angle can be
used to indicate the travelling vehicle direction.
 DD: it refers to the variation in the difference in distance
between two points before map matching and after map
matching.
 DS: it refers to the difference in vehicle speed between GPS
speed and Doppler speed.
The fuzzy system is comprised of 18 knowledge-based
fuzzy rules as listed in Table 1. The first factor in the fuzzy
Fig. 5 e Test route for the first data set.
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indicates a change in the vehicle direction, and hence, no
integrity. If it is less than 90, it is assumed that the
direction of the vehicle is unchanged. The second factor in
the fuzzy system is DD. According to Chalko (2007), the
speed given by the GPS receiver is exposed to a zig-zag error.
Therefore, speed validation requires distance validation. DD
is the second factor to achieve validation and does so by
checking the different distances between each of the two
points before and after map matching. The closer the DD
value is to zero, the better the integrity is. With this in mind,
the analysis of the positioning data sets shows that there
are three clipping levels for DD: if DD is greater than 8, then
the integrity based on DD is un-trustable; if DD is less than
or equal to 4, then the integrity based on DD is trustworthy;
if DD is greater than 4 and less or equal to 8, then the
integrity of DD is less trustworthy. Similarly, the integrity
basis of DS is divided into three clipping levels. The first
level is the most trustworthy for speed integrity, when DS is
less than or equal to 5. The second level is less trustworthy,
when the DS is greater than 5 and less than or equal to 10.
Finally, the third level is trustworthy, when DS is greater
than 10.4.3. Evaluation
The criteria that is widely used to evaluate the performance of
an integrity algorithm is the overall correct detection rate
(OCDR) (Bonnifait et al., 2009; Jabbour et al., 2008; Quddus,
2006; Toledo-moreo et al., 2010; Velaga, 2010). The OCDR refers
to the accuracy of an integrity system in providing correct
alerts to users. Thus, there is a percentage of incorrect alerts
which have two types.
① False alarms (FA): it refers to the number of incorrect
alerts that the system triggered, despite no error in the
positioning points that affect integrity.
② Missed detections (MD): it refers to the number of mis-
takes in the final positioning output not identified by the
integrity system.
Therefore, the performance of a proposed integrity algo-
rithm can be measured with respect to false alarm rate (FAR),
MDR, and OCDR. As suggested by some researchers, the OCDR
equation can be written as follows (Quddus, 2006; Velaga,
2010; Jabbour et al., 2008; Bonnifait et al., 2009; Toledo-moreo
et al., 2010).
Fig. 6 e Test route for the second data set.
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FAR ¼ f
o
(16)
MDR ¼ m
o
(17)
where o is the total number of observations, f is the total
number of false alarms, and m is the total number of missed
detections.
The total number of f and m require positioning informa-
tion from a highly accurate source in the form of a true
reference. The true reference is a highly accurate GPS carrier-
phase observation integrated in high-grade INS devices to
record positioning data. When an alert to indicate integrity is
prepared, it is important to identify the integrity threshold.
When the integrity value of a positioning point is less than this
threshold, the point is considered to have no integrity and an
alert should be raised. In order to obtain that value, the posi-
tioning points in the data collected are used to observe
changes in FA andMD. Fig. 8 shows that the FA increases with
the slight change of the MD. Therefore, the best value to be
used as a threshold is the point of intersection between FAand MD. It can be seen that the intersection point is equal to
71. Therefore, in the case of any positioning point, if the
integrity scale is less than 71, an alert should be raised.4.4. Results
Following the application of the fuzzy rules, the data analysis
shows that the total number of false alarms and missed de-
tections vary from one track to another. Table 3 lists the
number of missed detection points, and false alarms in each
data set. In the first track, there are 14 false alarms and 8
missed detections. The number of positioning points was
much bigger in the second track than that of positioning
points in the first track. The number of false alarms is 10
and the number of missed detections is 16. In the last track,
the number of false alarms is 11 and the number of missed
detections is 19, which is significantly higher.
The OCDR for each date set was found to be 0.9824 for data
set 1, 0.9923 for data set 2, and 0.9729 for data set 3. Table 4
depicts the FAR, MDR, and OCDR for each data set. The
OCDR indicates the accuracy of the integrity algorithm
developed and reflects the rate of correct warnings given by
the system, that the testing process takes place on a
machine with the following characteristics: Intel® core™ i5
Fig. 7 e Test route for the third data set.
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system.5. Discussion
5.1. Key features of the speed integrity method
This research proposed, developed, implemented and tested a
new method to accurately check and validate the integrity ofFig. 8 e Integrity threshold.positioning points. This comprised three levels of integrity
checks. Each level used a different technique to check the
consistency of the GPS information. The levels were:
① A receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) al-
gorithm to measure the quality of the GPS positioning
output.
② GPS Doppler information to check the integrity of the
vehicle velocity, which contributes a new layer of
integrity and could improve the performance of the
map matching process.
③ Confirmation of the integrity of the map matching
algorithm.
In addition, a fuzzy inference system was developed to
manage situations where the integrity of a given positioning
point was uncertain. The system depended on three addi-
tional factors, including DA, DS, and DD.
As previously reported, the integrity method combined
with the fuzzy inference system, can be used to check and
validate the integrity of a given positioning point with an ac-
curacy exceeding 98.6% which is more accurate than many of
the alternative newly proposed systems discussed in the
literature review, as shown in Table 5 below.With this level of
accuracy in mind, it can be stated with confidence that the
integrity algorithm developed in this research performs
better than the majority of existing integrity methods in
Table 3 e Numbers of missed detection points, and false
alarms raised by the system.
Data set Missed detection False alarm
1 8 14
2 16 10
3 19 11
Table 5 e Performances of existing integrity methods.
Author of integrity method Performance
Yu et al. (2006) MDR is 1.41%
Quddus (2006) 91.1% valid warnings
Jabbour et al. (2008) 88.8% valid integrity warnings
Velaga (2010) 98.2% valid integrity warnings
Integrity method developed in
this research
98.6% valid integrity warnings
Note: both valid warnings and valid integrity warnings are using a
weight based topological MM algorithm.
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(2010). Using the same evaluation technique they applied the
OCDR but the integrity method developed in this research
offers a better accuracy. Other integrity methods developed
by other researchers (Yu et al., 2006) are less accurate and
use different performance evaluation techniques.
Hence, the key features of the integrity method developed
in this research are as follows.
① Accurate identification of the final positioning point by
minimizing the effect of errors associated with the
positioning data, speed, map and map matching.
② Reliance on the Doppler speed to the integrity of each
positioning point before and after map matching.
③ Development of a fuzzy inference system to deal with
uncertainty associated with the integrity of matched
points and to measure integrity level.
④ Use of newweight parameters, e.g., speed and distance,
in the integrity validation measurement.5.2. Fuzzy parameters' weights
Three fuzzy factors were used in the fuzzy inference system.
① Indicates vehicle direction, and is given 40% of the total
weight. This weight is the largest attributed to any
factor in the system. This value is chosen empirically
after analysis of the variation in the azimuth angle be-
tween the two points in each data set. Variation in the
azimuth angle was found to be strong enough to be
relied upon to identify the vehicle heading, and was
suggested by Quddus (2006).
② Delta distance is an indicator of distance integrity.
Chalko (2007) observed that inaccuracies in positioning
data lead to zig-zagging and overestimation of the
travelling distance. The distance after map matching
is based on a smooth and straight line, which always
measures less than a line with zig-zags. Therefore, the
distance between matched points after map matching
over a given link is compared with that between those
points joined with a zig-zag (before the matching) to
indicate the amount of distortion caused by the zig-Table 4 e Overall correct detection rate of each data set.
Data set Number of point 3-level check (passed)
1 1245 913 points
2 3335 2994 points
3 1105 809 pointszag and its effect on speed. Delta distance is awarded
the remaining weight in the system, which is 30% of
the system's total weight. Once the distance integrity
is checked and validated, it can be relied on to validate
speed.
③ Delta speed indicates the speed integrity of each point.
Previous researchers including Quddus (2006) and
Velaga (2010) have used speed to calculate the
distance in map matching processing, but no one has
used speed in integrity checking. However, Quddus
(2006) has mentioned that speed is an essential factor
in enhancing the map matching algorithm. Indeed,
speed integrity monitoring is vital. Moreover, Li et al.
(2013) have stated that failure in any factor in the map
matching process can lead to defects throughout the
whole process, thus the integrity of the speed is
checked in the Doppler level and by using delta speed
in the fuzzy system. Delta speed is awarded 30% of the
system's total weight. This value is obtained
empirically based on a comparison of vehicle speed
obtained from GPS Doppler and the map matching
process. This is done for each point. Delta speed is
calculated by subtracting vehicle speed obtained from
the GPS Doppler from the one obtained on calculations
based on the map matching process. The closer this
value is to zero, the better the integrity is. It is
important to note that the speed obtained from map
matching is calculated based on distance.5.3. Integrity scale threshold
The integrity scale threshold is set at 71. Any point with an
integrity weighting below this threshold would cause the
system to alert the user. The threshold value of a given point is
the summation of the resulting weight of each fuzzy factor in
the fuzzy inference system for that point. This value is ob-
tained using a method similar to that used by Quddus (2006)
and Velaga (2010) which is the intersection point in the
variation between false alarms and missed detection points.Environment FAR MDR OCDR (%)
Urban 0.0112 0.0064 98.24
Rural 0.0029 0.0048 99.23
Mix 0.0099 0.0172 97.29
Fig. 9 e Miss detection errors in the system (true reference
(red) and wrongly matched location (green)).
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threshold and the threshold obtained in this research are
small despite the number of points used to empirically
obtain the values. Therefore, the number of points used to
obtain the threshold value is not that significant and it
cannot be used to indicate whether a threshold is more
accurate than the other, including the threshold used in this
research. The method for calculating the threshold is similar
in all three studies and the data used for the threshold
calculation is collected in and around Nottingham's urban
and suburban areas. The only justification for the
differences in threshold values relates to the fuzzy factors
and the weights that are used when validating the
positioning point integrity.
5.4. Reliability
The authors benefitted from the generosity of the University
of Nottingham's loan of a dedicated vehicle equipped with
highly accurate GPS carrier-phase devices integrated with a
high-grade INS device. These highly accurate positioning data
and collection devices could be used as a true reference.
Aponte et al. (2009) have found that the accuracy of the
integrated carrier-phase GPS and the INS is better than 5 cm
for over 97.5% of the time for all three coordinate
components. Without the existence of the true reference it
would not be possible to confirm the accuracy of the system
output. For example, in critical cases, where road maps are
too complex (i.e., have too many intersections), the map
matching algorithm could encounter some mismatching
errors that would be impossible to discover without a true
reference (Fig. 9). In addition, the true reference could be
used to confirm the speed of the vehicle, since it includes
INS that can accurately calculate the acceleration.
5.5. Location-based ITS applications
ITS are widely used in transportation systems such as those
for emergency management, public transport management,
commercial vehicle operations, and traffic control and vehicle
safety systems. They can reduce the risk of accidents, control
congestion, improve road safety and maintenance, and
reduce adverse environmental impacts.
Since location-based ITS services continuously require
vehicle positioning information in order to track the vehicles
and perform their operations, the integrity algorithm devel-
oped in this research is of great value to such systems. It can
check the integrity of positioning information and inform the
vehicle users of any potential uncertainty (e.g., avoidTable 6e Comparison between integrity threshold values
in this research and other researches.
Author of the
integrity method
Threshold
value
Number of points used to
obtain a threshold value
Quddus (2006) 70 2040
Velaga (2010) 82 10,347
Threshold obtained
in this research
71 5685confusing the driver in route guidance applications). In addi-
tion, it checks the integrity of vehicle speed which is signifi-
cantly important for critical ITS applications. For example, in
pay as your speed service, drivers are charged whenever they
exceed the speed limit of the current road. However, drivers
may charge wrongly if the integrity of speed information is
wrong. Therefore, incorporating the proposed algorithm with
such applications can enhance the performance by avoiding
wrong charges in the absent of speed integrity.6. Conclusions
In this paper, an integrity algorithm for monitoring land
vehicle navigation systems was developed. The objective of
this study was to ensure that the navigation information is
consistent and triggers alerts to the users when the informa-
tion is not trustworthy. Three phases of integrity checks are
developed in the algorithm. RAIM algorithm is used to mea-
sure the quality of the GPS positioning data. The GPS Doppler
data is used to check the integrity of the vehicle speed, which
adds a new layer of integrity. In addition, it improves the
performance of themapmatching process due to the fact that
the integrity of all inputs is checked. The final phase in the
integrity algorithm is intended to verify the integrity of the
mapmatching algorithm. The results of the algorithm suggest
that the system can verify the integrity of positioning points
before and aftermapmatchingwith an accuracy of 98.6%. The
strengths of the method proceed of the layered integrity
checks, which minimize the effect of errors associated with
position data, speed data, map and map matching process.
The performance evaluation of the proposed integrity al-
gorithm is based on a data set, collected in urban and rural
areas in Nottingham. However, it is vital to validate the
effectiveness of the algorithm in more complex environ-
ments, such as areas with high rise buildings, for example,
Hong Kong or New York, in order to increase the usability of
the algorithm. Therefore, further investigationswill be carried
out to test the performance of the system in such
environments.
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